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ABSTRACT
Two key facts about European unemployment must be explained: the rise in unemployment since
the 1960s, and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences.  While adverse shocks can potentially
explain much of the rise in unemployment, there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain
cross-country differences.  Alternatively, while explanations focusing on labor market institutions explain
cross-country differences explain current heterogeneity well, many of these institutions pre-date the rise in
unemployment.  Based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 OECD nations since 1960, we find that
the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylized facts.  We test two
specifications, and each offers significant support for our interactions hypothesis.  The first speculation
assumes that there are common but unobservable shocks across countries, and that these shocks have a
larger and more persistent effect in countries with poor labor market institutions.  The second constructs
series for the macro shocks, and again finds evidence that the same size shock has differential effects on
unemployment when labor market institutions differ.  We interpret this as suggesting that institutions
determine the relevance of the unemployed to wage-setting, thereby determining the evolution of equilibrium
unemployment rates following a shock.
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Fig 1 shows the evolution of unemployment in Europe since 1960. The figure
plots average unemployment rates over 5—year intervals, starting in 1960, both
for the OECD—Europe as a whole (the line) and for 15 individual OECD—Europe
countries.1 It shows the increase in the overall unemployment rate, from 1.7%
in the early 1960s to 11.0% in the mid 1 990s, together with the large dispersion
in unemployment rates across countries, from 4.0% in Switzerland to more than
20% in Spain in the mid 1990s.
Explanations for these evolutions fall into three classes:
•Explanations that focus on the role of adverse economic shocks, Adverse
shocks can indeed increase the unemployment rate, at least for some time.
And there are many plausible candidates for such adverse shocks over the
last 30 years. As unemployment started rising in the 1970s, the focus was on
oil price increases and the TFP growth slowdown. Since then, the evolution
of the real interest rate, and other shifts in labor demand have been added
to the list.
Explanations based solely on shocks run however into a major empirical
problem. Shocks can potentially explain the general increase in unemploy-
ment over time. But, as we shall see, they do not differ enough across coun-
1. The 8 tmie periods are 1960—1964 to 1990—1994, and 1995+ (typically 1995—1996,) The 15
countries included in OECD—Europe are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United King-
dom. Left out are Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg, for which we could not construct time series
for all the explanatory variables used later in the article. The unemployment rates are the rates ac-
cording to national definitions, rather than standardized rates—which typically do not exist back
to 1960 (For the period when both unemployment rates exist, using one or the other makes little
difference.) Also, while the figures only show what has happened in Europe, the regressions we run
later look at all available OECD countries; they include, in addition to Europe, the United States,
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tries to explain the cross—country variation so evident in Fig 1.
Explanations that focus on the role of adverse labor market institutions.
Labor market institutions affect the nature of unemployment, and some
can indeed potentially generate a high unemployment rate. With the per-
sistence of high unemployment for now more than two decades, explana-
tions based on adverse institutions ("labor market rigidities") have become
steadily more popular.
Explanations based solely on institutions also run however into a major em-
pirical problem: Many of these institutions were already present when un-
employment was low (and similar across countries), and, while many be-
came less employment—friendly in the 1970s, the movement since then has
been mostly in the opposite direction. Thus, while labor market institutions
can potentially explain cross country differences today, they do not appear
able to explain the general evolution of unemployment over time.
•Explanations that focus on the interaction of adverse shocks with adverse
market institutions. Some institutions may affect the impact of shocks on
unemployment. For example, better coordination in bargaining may lead
to a faster adjustment of real wages to a slowdown in productivity growth.
Some institutions may affect the persistence of unemployment in response
to shocks. For example, if labor market institutions lead to a labor market
with long unemployment duration, adverse shocks are more likely to lead
some of the unemployed to become disenfranchised, reducing the pressure
of unemployment on wages, thereby slowing, and possibly even halting the
return to lower unemployment.
It is easy to see what makes this third class of explanations attractive. It has
the potential to explain not only the increase in unemployment over time
(through adverse shocks), but also the heterogeneity of unemployment evo-
lutions (through the interaction of the shocks with different labor market
institutions).
In a companion paper (Blanchard [1999]), we took stock of the underlying alter-Shocks and Institutions 4
native theories. We looked at whether and how different shocks and different in-
stitutions may affect the unemployment rate. We looked at the channels through
which shocks and institutions might interact. This led us to argue in favor of
the third class of explanations. In this article, we look at the aggregate empirical
evidence more formally, at the role of shocks, institutions, and interactions, in
accounting for the evolution of European unemployment.
To do so, we look at the data through two panel data specifications. In the first,
we assume unobservable but common shocks across countries. In the second, we
construct and use country—specific time series for a number of shocks. In both
specifications, we allow for an interaction between shocks and institutions: The
effect of a given shock on unemployment is allowed to depend on the set of labor
market institutions of the country.
We see the results as surprisingly (at least given our priors) good: Specifications
that allow for shocks, institutions, and interactions can account both for much of
the rise and much of the heterogeneity in the evolution of unemployment in Eu-
rope. The magnitudes of the effects of the shocks on unemployment are plausible.
The magnitudes of the effects of institutions are equally so. And their interactions
explain much of the difference across countries.
These results notwithstanding, three caveats are in order. First, the results are pre-
liminary. In many cases, we do not have time series for institutions, and the series
we have may not be very good. Second, the results are typically weaker when we
allow for time—varying rather than time—invariant measures for institutions. This
gives some reasons to worry. Last, the fact that the specifications fit the data does
not prove that the underlying theories are right; just that they are not obviously
inconsistent with the aggregate data.
We believe we are the first to analyze the panel data evidence looking simulta-
neously at shocks, institutions and interactions. But we build on a large number
of previous studies. Bruno and Sachs [1985] were among the first to emphasizeShocks and Institutions 5
both shocks and institutions in the initial rise in unemployment. An empirical
attempt to explain U.K unemployment as a result of shocks, institutions, and in-
teractions was presented by Layard et al. [19911 in their book on unemployment.
Two recent influential studies are by Phelps [1994] and by Nickell [1997]. We dif-
fer mostly from Phelps by allowing for institutions, and for interactions. We differ
mostly from Nickell by allowing for observable shocks, and by having a panel data
dimension going back to the 1960s. Our results are partly consistent with those
of Phelps with respect to shocks, and largely consistent with those of Nickell with
respect to institutions.
Our article is organized as follows: Section 1 looks at shocks, both across countries
and over time. Section 2 does the same for institutions. Section 3 discusses po-
tential interactions between shocks and institutions. Section 4 reports the results
of estimation under the assumption of unobservable but common shocks across
countries. Section 5 reports the results of estimation using country-specific time
series for shocks. Section 6 concludes.2
1Shocks
Three shocks appear to have played an important role in the increase in European
uneniployment. (This short declarative sentence conveys more certainty than is
justified, Caveats follow.)
The decline in TFP growth
Starting in the early 1970s, Europe suffered a large decrease in the underlying rate
of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This is shown in Fig 2. The two lines
2. We shall use the existence of the companion paper as an excuse for keeping our discussion of
theoretical issues, and of relevant references, to a minimum.
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in Fig 2a give the evolution of the average rate of TFP growth for the 15 countries
of OECD—Europe (E15 in what follows) and for the 5 largest European countries,
France, Qermany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (ES). To give a sense of
the heterogeneity across countries, Fig 2b gives the evolution of TFP growth in
each of the ES countries. (Showing all 15 countries would clutter the figure but
yield similar conclusions). TFP growth which had been close to 5% in the 1960s
decreased to 3% in the first half of the 197 Os, and to 2% in the second half of the
1970s. It has remained around 2% since then. The decline has affected countries
in roughly similar fashion.4
This decrease in TFP growth was initially partially hidden by the large increase
in the relative price of oil and other raw materials. Thus, much of the focus of
the initial research (for example Bruno and Sacbs [1985]) was on this increase
in relative prices rather than on the slowdown in TFP growth. In retrospect, the
slowdown in TFP growth from its unusually high level in the first 30 years after
World War II was surely the more important shock of the period.5
There is no question that a slowdown in TFP growth can lead to a higher equi-
librium unemployment rate for some time (we prefer to use "equilibrium rate"
rather than "natural rate", but the meaning is the same.) All that is needed is
theSolow residual for thebusiness sector, and then dividing it by the labor share in the sector. Under
the assumption of Harrod neutral technological progress—the assumption that allows for steady
state growth—this is the right measure of technological progress, and gives the rate at which real
wages can grow along the balanced growth path. We then take averages for each 5—year period,
for each country. E5 and E15 are constructed as simple (unweighted) averages of TFP growth over
countries.
4. Note that, in contrast to the other observations which are based on five yearly observations, the
observation for 1995 is typically based on only one year (1995) or two years (1995 and 1996). Thus,
one year can make a lot of difference. This is the case for Italy in this figure.
5. An early article on that theme is Grubb et al. 119821,Shocks and Institutions 7
that it takes some time for workers and firms to adjust expectations to the new
lower underlying rate, leading to wage growth in excess of productivity growth for
some time. Can the effects of such a slowdown on unemployment be permanent?
Theory suggests that the answer, to a first approximation, is no. Once expecta-
tions have adjusted, the effect on unemployment should mostly go away. There
lies the first puzzle of European unemployment. The initial shock is clearly identi-
fied. But, after more than twenty years, it is hard to believe that its effects are not
largely gone. So, what accounts for today's high unemployment? There is much
less agreement here, but two other shocks appear relevant.
The real interest rate
Fig 3a gives the evolution of the average real interest rate for both the E15 and
the E5. Fig 3b gives the real interest rate for each of the E5 countries. 6
Fig3 shows that, both for the E15 and the E5 countries, the real rate turned from
positive in the 1960s to sharply negative in the second half of the 1970s, and then
to large and positive in the 1980s and the 1990s. For some countries, the decline
in the 1970s was nearly as dramatic as the ensuing increase. Fig 3b shows how the
real rate in Spain went down from 2% in the 1960s to —5% in the mid 1970s, back
to 5% in the 1980s and the 1990s. For others, such as Germany, the real rate has
remained much more stable.
Why might such changes in the real interest rate affect the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate?7 Because they are likely to affect capital accumulation, and so,
6. We first compute the real interest rate for each year and each country, as the nominal long rate
on government bonds minus a five-year average of lagged inflation, We then take averages for each
5—year period.
7. The focus here is on the effects on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Changes in the real
interest rate also affect the deviation of actual unemployment from the equilibrium rate, We focus
on that effect below..06-
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at a given wage (and thus a given ratio of employment to capital), to shift la-
bor demand. Are the effects on unemployment likely to be permanent? Theory is
largely agnostic here. Again, a plausible answer is that long run effects, if present,
are likely to be small.
It is clear from Fig 3 that the pattern of interest rates may help explain why un-
employment kept increasing in the 1980s, even as the effects of lower TFP growth
on unemployment were—presumably-—declining. This suggests that, had real in-
terest rates been stable, unemployment would have been higher in the 1970s, and
lower in the 1980s. Put another way, the low real interest rates of the 1970s de-
layed some of the increase in unemployment by a decade or so. The higher real
interest rates since the early 1980s may help explain why unemployment has re-
mained high in the 1 980s and the 1 990s.
Shifts in labor demand
Fig 4 gives the evolution of the log of the labor share for both the E15 and the E5
(normalized to equal zero in 1960). For both groups of countries, the evolution of
the share is quite striking. After increasing in the 1970s, the labor share started
decreasing in 1980s and the decline has continued since then. For the E5, the
labor share is now 10% lower than it was in 1960; for the E15, it is 8% lower.
Why look at the evolution of the labor share? Suppose that technology were char-
acterized by a Cobb—Douglas production function, both in the short and the long
run. The decrease in the share since the 1980s would then reflect either techno-
logical bias away from labor—a decrease in the coefficient on labor in the pro-
duction function— or a decrease in the wage relative to the marginal product of
labor. In either case, the implication would be an adverse shift in labor demand
and thus a potential source of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s.8
8. Let Y =NK1a.Let the ratio of the wage to the marginal product of labor w/Y,
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The elasticity of substitution may be equal to one in the long run, but it is surely
less than one in the short run. In that case, movements in the share will also reflect
the dynamic response of factor proportions to factor prices. Indeed, much of the
increase in the labor share in the 1970s surely reflects the effects of the increase
in the real wage relative to TFP growth together with a low short-run elasticity
of substitution, and some of the decrease since then reflects the adjustment of
proportions over time. In Blanchard [19971, we argued however that more has
been at work than the adjustment of factor proportions to factor prices, and that
the large decline in the share reflects a genuine adverse shift in labor demand.
We shall use the measure of the shift in labor demand constructed in that earlier
article. This measure can be thought as the log of the labor share purged of the ef-
fects of factor prices on the share in the presence of a low elasticity of substitution
in the short run. Fig 5a plots the evolution of this measure of the labor demand
shift for both the E5 and the E15, Fig 5b plots the evolution of the measure for
each of the E5 countries. Both figures show how the adjustment eliminates much
of the increase and subsequent unwinding in the share in the 1970s (visible in Fig
4). Fig 5a shows little movement in the measure until the mid 1980s, with a strong
decrease thereafter. Fig 5b shows the sharp difference between the UK where, if
anything the shift has been positive (the underlying labor share has remained
roughly constant) and countries such as Spain or France (where the adverse shift
has exceeded 1O%).
otherwise. Then the share of labor a =ajz.Adecrease in a reflects a decrease in a or a decrease in
ji.Alsolabor demand can be written as log N =logY —logw+log a. A decrease in log a leads
to an equal decrease in log N given output and the wage. This is why we look at the log share.
9. This distinction between Anglo—Saxon and Continental countries is discussed in Blanchard
[1997]. The difference in evolutions reflects divergence rather than convergence of the shares in
levels: For the last period (1995+), the labor share in the business sector was 62% for France and
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Such an adverse shift in labor demand can clearly lead to higher equilibrium un-
employment for some time. Its dynamic effects however are quite different from
those of the two shocks we looked at earlier. Think for example of the shift as
coming from a reduction in labor hoarding by firms—one of the interpretations
suggested in Blanchard [1997]. As firms get rid of redundant workers, the result
will be a decrease in employment, and so an increase in unemployment. Thus,
such a shift has the potential to explain why unemployment has remained high
in many countries in the 1990s. But the decrease in labor hoarding also leads to
higher profit, which in turn should lead, over time, to capital accumulation and
higher employment. This is a relevant point to keep in mind when one thinks
about the future. If it is the case that such a shift is indeed responsible for some
of the unemployment of the 1990s, then this suggests a brighter future, as the
favorable effects start dominating and lead to an increase in employment over
time.
Equilibrium versus actual unemployment
We have focused so far on factors that affect equilibrium unemployment. There is
no question however that part of the evolution of unemployment in Europe comes
from the deviation of actual unemployment from equilibrium unemployment.
In environments of low to medium inflation, the change in inflation is likely to be
a good signal of where equilibrium unemployment is relative to actual unemploy-
ment. Decreasing inflation is likely to reflect an unemployment rate above the
equilibrium rate; increasing inflation reflects the reverse. Fig 6a shows the evolu-
tion of the change in inflation for the E5 and the El 5. Fig 6b shows the evolution
of the change in inflation for each of the E5Thechange in inflation was positive
in the 1970s, suggesting an actual unemployment rate below the equilibrium rate.
share levels across countries applies.)
10. We first construct the change in inflation (using the business sector (3DP deflator) for each year
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The change in inflation has been negative since then, suggesting the equilibrium
rate has been lower than the actual rate. In other words, macroeconomic policy
probably delayed some of the increase in unemployment from the 1970s to the
1980s. And, as inflation is still slowly declining, actual unemployment probably
exceeds equilibrium unemployment at this point. By how much is difficult to say:
the relation between the change in inflation and the deviation of unemployment
from its equilibrium may well be different at very low inflation.
Two caveats as we end this section. First, what we have taken as "shocks" are
at best proximate causes, and should be traced to deeper causes. This is particu-
larly clear for real interest rates and labor demand shifts. Second, there may well
have been other shocks, from increased turbulence (although the quantitative ev-
idence on this is not very supportive), to shifts in the relative demand for skilled
and unskilled workers (although, on this point as well, the evidence for Europe
is mixed. See for example Nickell and Bell [1994].) We have not explored their
role here.
To conclude: This section suggests the following story. Europe was bit with ma-
jor adverse shocks in the 1970s, oil price increases, but also, and more impor-
tantly, a large and sustained decrease in TFP growth. Unemployment increased,
but the adverse impact was initially softened both by lower real interest rates and a
macroeconomic policy leading to less of an increase in actual than in equilibrium
unemployment. As the effect of the adverse shocks of the 1970s receded, higher
interest rates and tight macroeconomic policy contributed to higher equilibrium
and actual unemployment in the 1980s. Finally, adverse labor demand shifts can
potentially account for why unemployment has remained high in the 1990s. Thus,
shocks appear to have the potential to explain the broad evolution of European
unemployment. But, at least to the naked eye, differences in the evolution of un-
employment across countries seem difficult to trace back to differences in shocks.Shocks and Institutions 12
2Institutions
While in the 1970s the discussion of the rise of unemployment focused primarily
on shocks, the persistence of high unemployment for another two decades has
led to a shift in focus from shocks to labor market institutions. Indeed, many dis-
cussions of European unemployment ignore shocks altogether, and focus exclu-
sively on "labor market rigidities". What typically follows is a long list of so—called
"rigidities", from strong unions, to high payroll taxes, to minimum wages, to gen-
erous unemployment insurance, to high employment protection, and so on.
We have learned however from theory that things are more complicated. Some
of the so—called rigidities may represent rough institutional corrections for other
distortions in the labor market. Some institutions may be bad for productivity,
for output, and for welfare, but may not lead to an increase in unemployment. A
short summary of the large literature —a literature largely triggered by the rise in
European unemployment—goes as follows:'1
•Some labor market institutions increase the equilibrium unemployment
rate. First among them is the unemployment insurance system. More gener-
ous insurance increases unemployment through two separate channels: The
first, and the focus of most microeconomic empirical work, is lower search
intensity. The second is the effect on the bargained wage at a given rate of
unemployment. Both combine to increase equilibrium unemployment du-
ration, and, by implication, the equilibrium unemployment rate.12
•Some labor market institutions change the nature of unemployment, but
11. A longer discussion is given in our companion paper. A nice theoretical discussion is given by
Mortensen and Pissarides [1998]. A wider ranging presentation of both theory and facts is given by
Nickell and Layard [19981,
12.The steady state unemployment rate is equal to unemployment duration times the flow into
unemployment as a ratio to the labor force. Unemployment benefits increase duration, and leave
the flow roughly unchanged, increasing the unemployment rate.Shocks and Institutions 13
have an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate. This is
the case for employment protection. Employment protection both decreases
the flows of workers through the labor market, and increases the duration
of unemployment. This makes for a more stagnant labor market, with a
higher proportion of long—term unemployed. But the effect of lower flows
and higher duration on the equilibrium rate itself is ambiguous.
•Some labor market institutions may not have much effect either on the rate
or on the nature of unemployment. Their incidence may be mainly on the
wage, not on unemployment. This is the case for many of the components
of the so called "tax wedge." Some of these components are really not taxes,
but rather payments for health benefits, or retirement: The effect of these
components on unemployment should be small. As to the tax component,
what matters is how taxes affect the ratio of after—tax unemployment ben-
efits to after—tax wages. Taxes which by their nature apply equally on the
unemployed and the employed, such as consumption or income taxes, are
likely to be roughly neutral. And if the unemployment insurance system tries
to achieve a stable relation of unemployment benefits to after—tax wages—a
reasonable assumption—even payroll taxes may not matter very much.
Turning to the evidence, the two relevant questions are: How much do labor mar-
ket institutions vary across countries? And how have they evolved over time?
Thanks to work by the OECD and by a large number of researchers, we have fairly
good answers to the first question. The state of knowledge has recently been sum-
marized by Nickell [1997] and Nickell and Layard [1998]. 13Inmuch of what
we do later, we shall use the data for institutions put together by Nickell and
described in those two articles. For the moment, suffice it to say that, based on
13. In addition to the references in these two articles: For a recent comparison of various measures
of unemployment insurance, see Salomaki and Munzi [1999]. For a recent comparison of measures
of employment protection, see OECD [1999], Chapter 2.Shocks and Institutions 14
the measures which have been constructed for various labor market institutions,
and the cross section evidence: (1) there is substantial heterogeneity across Eu-
ropean countries (2) this heterogeneity appears to have the potential to explain
differences in unemployment rates across countries today Countries with high
unemployment rates typically have less employment—friendly institutions.
This raises the second question, the evolution of institutions over time. The ba-
sic question is a simple one. Have European labor market institutions become
steadily worse since the early 1970s (in which case explanations based solely on
institutions can potentially explain the evolution of unemployment) ? Or do they
in fact date back much further, to a time when unemployment was still low (in
which case explanations based solely on institutions face a major puzzle)? The
question is simple, but the answer is not.
Time series for at least part of the period and a subset of countries have been put
together for some institutions—replacement rates, unionization, the tax wedge—
by the OECD and other researchers. But, in general, our knowledge of the evo-
lution of institutions is rather limited. We shall look here at two institutions only,
unemployment insurance, and employment protection.
.TheOECD has constructed a measure of the replacement rate for each
country, every two years, going back to 1961. The measure is an average
of the replacement rates for different categories of workers, different family
situations, and different durations of unemployment. Each replacement rate
is constructed as the ratio of pre—tax social insurance and social assistance
benefits to the pre—tax wage. Fig 7a gives the evolution of this measure of
the replacement rate, for each 5—year period, for each of the E5 countries.
The figure clearly shows the different evolutions across countries. In Ger-
many, France, and the UK, the replacement rate was relatively high to start;
it has increased a bit in France, decreased a bit in Germany, decreased a bit
more in the U.K. In Spain and Italy, the replacement rate was very low at
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Fig 7b Maximum replacement rate, E5Shocks and Institutions 15
Both are now at levels comparable to other countries. In short, there is no
simple common trend.
The OECD measure is a summary measure of the replacement rate, and in
some ways, not a very attractive one. It gives equal weight to the replace-
ment rate in year 1 of an unemployment spell, to the average replacement
rate in years 2 and 3, and to the average replacement rate for years 4 and
5; but given the exit rate from unemployment, the generosity of benefits in
years 4 and 5 for example is clearly less important for the determination of
unemployment than the generosity of unemployment in year 1. Fig 7b pro-
vides a different angle by showing the maximum replacement rate over all
categories and all durations of unemployment for each country and each
subperiod. What clearly comes out is how this rate increased until the late
1970s, and how (except for Italy, which has converged from a low maximum
replacement rate to the European average) it has decreased since then. In
other words, the worst excesses have been largely eliminated. This may be
more important than changes in the average replacement rate.
Putting together series on employment protection is difficult. We have taken
a first step by constructing series based on recent work by the OECD (see
OECD [1999]), as well as on earlier work by Lazear [1990]. Details of con-
struction are given in the appendix. There are a number of reasons why
these series are at best rough approximations to the evolution of employ-
ment protection. In particular, the OECD data, which we use to construct
the measures from 1985 on, are based on a much broader set of dimensions
of employment protection than the Lazear series (notice period and sever-
ance pay for a blue collar worker with ten years seniority) which we use to
construct the series before 1985.
This caveat notwithstanding, Fig 8 shows the evolution of the employment
protection index for the E5 countries since 1960. (The figure for the ElS
would be harder to read, but yield similar conclusions). Note again the di-
versity of evolutions, and the lack of a simple answer.JESP TA TA 4
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Spain arid Italy appear to have had high employment protection through-
out. Employment protection in Spain was high even under Franco, before
unemployment increased. In both countries, employment protection has de-
creased since the mid 1980s—in Spain, largely because of the development
of fixed term contracts rather than the weakening of protection for work-
ers on indefinite contracts. In France and Germany, employment protection
was low to start with, then increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
has been roughly stable since then.'4
To conclude: There is enough heterogeneity in labor market institutions within
Europe to potentially explain differences in unemployment rates today. As to the
evolution of institutions over time, it is clear that neither the view that labor mar-
ket institutions have been stable through time, nor the view that labor market
rigidities are a recent development are right. Some countries have had these in-
stitutions for a long time, others have acquired them more recently. There clearly
was an increase in employment—unfriendly institutions in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Since then, there appears to have been a small but steady decline.
3Interactions
Our review of facts makes clear why it is tempting to look for explanations of the
rise of European unemployment based on the interaction of shocks and institu-
tions: Adverse shocks can potentially explain the general increase in unemploy-
ment. Differences in institutions can potentially explain differences in outcomes
across countries. This is indeed the direction that has been explored in much of
the recent research on unemployment. This section gives a brief assessment of the
14. Informal evidence suggests that employment protection was high in France even in the 1960s.
Again, this is not reflected in the Lazear measure, and by implication, not reflected in our measure
either. This may be an issue for other countries as well.Shocks and Institutions 17
current state of knowledge.15
One can think of labor market institutions as shaping the effects of shocks on
unemployment in two ways. First, they can affect the impact of shocks on unem-
ployment. Second, they can affect the persistence of unemployment in response
to shocks.
Most of the initial research explored the first direction, focusing on how the na-
ture and the details of collective bargaining might determine the response of un-
employment to various shocks.16 It pointed for example to the importance of in-
dexation clauses in labor contracts. It also pointed to the potential importance of
the level and the structure of collective bargaining: It might be easier for example
to achieve a slowdown in wage growth in response to a slowdown in productivity
growth if bargaining takes place at the national rather than the firm or sectoral
level—where aggregate trends may be less well perceived and understood, and
coordination of the slowdown may be more difficult to achieve.
As unemployment remained high, the research shifted to how labor market in-
stitutions might also explain the persistence of unemployment in response to
shocks.17 The general idea is as follows. Take an adverse shock which leads to
higher unemployment. The normal adjustment mechanism is then for unemploy-
ment to put pressure down on wages until unemployment has returned to normal.
To the extent that some labor market institutions reduce the effect of unemploy-
ment on wages, they will increase the persistence of unemployment in response
to shocks. Research has identified a number of such channels. Here is a non—
exhaustive list:
15, Again, see our companion paper for references, and discussion.
16, This was indeed one of the main themes of Bruno and Sachs [1985].
17. This was the motivation behind the admittedly crude "hysteresis model" of unemployment in
Blanchard and Summers [19861. Research since then has shown that while full hysteresis (perma-
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•A rise in unemployment typically comes with higher unemployment du-
ration (rather than higher flows in and out of unemployment). If some of
the unemployed remain unemployed for a long time, they may either stop
searching or lose skills. Indeed, the two factors reinforce the other: If firms
perceive the long term unemployed as more risky, they may be reluctant to
hire them, decreasing the incentives of the long term unemployed to search
for a job. But if they are not actively searching or employable, these unem-
ployed workers become irrelevant to wage formation. Firms do not consider
them. Employed workers do not see them as competition. The pressure of
unemployment on wages decreases, and unemployment becomes more per-
sistent. L.ayard and Nickell [1987] were the first to point to the potential
macroeconomic relevance of such duration dependence.
Why should institutions matter in this context? Because of their effect on
the average duration of unemployment. A well documented fact about Eu-
ropean labor markets is that, probably because of institutions such as more
generous benefits and employment protection, a given unemployment rate
is associated with much longer duration than in the United States.18 And
the longer the average duration of unemployment to start with, the more
likely the effects above are to play an important role. If an increase in the
unemployment rate from 5 to 10% is associated with an increase in unem-
ployment duration from 3 to 6 months, few of the unemployed will become
long—term unemployed. If instead, the same increase in the unemployment
rate implies an increase in duration from 1 to 2 years, then disenfranchising
effects are much more likely to be important.
•Higher unemployment falls unevenly on different groups in the labor mar-
ket. In most countries, higher unemployment tends to fall disproportionally
on the youngest workers and the less educated.
18. Seeforexample the comparison of the labor markets in Portugal and the United States in Blan-
chard and Portugal [1999],Shocks and Institutions 19
Labor market institutions affect the composition of the unemployed, thus
affecting the effects of unemployment back on wages. For example, a high
minimum wage can both increase the effect of adverse shocks on the un-
employment rate of the less educated workers, and—because the minimum
wage is fixed—reduce the effect of unemployment on wages. Collective bar-
gaining, to the extent that it reflects primarily the preferences and the labor
market prospects of prime—age workers, may also lead to little response of
wages to youth unemployment, and thus lead to more persistence in unem-
ployment.
Higher unemployment may lead to a change in norms—an argument devel-
oped in particular by Wilson [1987] in the context of urban poverty in the
United States, and by Lindbeck in the context of European unemployment
(for example Lindbeck [19951). As long as unemployment is low, workers
may be largely ignorant of the rules governing unemployment insurance, or
there may be a stigma attached to being unemployed. After a period of high
unemployment, ignorance is likely to disappear; attitudes vis—a—vis unem-
ployment are likely to change. Thus, countries with a more generous welfare
system may end up with higher unemployment, even when the shocks are
gone.
Other channels have been explored as well: Sargent and Ljundqvist [1995] have
explored the effect of unemployment insurance rules on the relation between
"turbulence" shocks and equilibrium unemployment. Mortensen and Pissarides
[1999] have explored the effect of unemployment insurance and employment
protection on the relation between relative demand shifts and equilibrium un-
employment. Our understanding of the specific channels and their empirical rel-
evance remains rather primitive. This is still very much work in progress, and
there is a need for substantially more theoretical and empirical work. Neverthe-
less, the general thrust is sufficiently clear for us to explore the potential role of
interactions in explaining the evolution of unemployment. This is what we do in
the rest of the article.Shocks and Institutions 20
4 Common unobservable shocks and interactions
In looking more formally at the data, we proceed in two steps. In this section,
we treat shocks as unobservable but common across countries—in effect we treat
them as time effects, In the next, we treat shocks as observable and country spe-
cific.
Our first specification in this section relies on the set of time invariant measures
of institutions used by Nickell [19971.19 The specification we use is the following:
=c+ d (1 + + et (1)
where i is a country index, t a (5—year) period index, and janinstitution index.
The dependent variable, u,, is the unemployment rate in country i in period t. c
is the country effect for country i. d is the time effect for period t. X.2 is the value
of institution jincountry i (in this first specification, we do not allow for time
variation in institutions, so there is no index t.) The specification allows for the
effects of the common time effects on unemployment to depend on the specific
set of labor market institutions of a country. This dependence is captured by the
parameters b.
The specification of equation (1) is clearly more a description of the data than
the outcome of a tightly specified theory of interactions. It does not distinguish in
particular between the effects of institutions on the impact or on the persistence
of shocks on unemployment. But it captures the basic hypothesis that, given the
same shocks, countries with worse institutions will experience higher unemploy-
ment.
We estimate this equation using data from 20 countries—the E15 countries listed
19.Nickell gives values for these institutions for both 1983-1988, and 1989-1994. We use the aver-
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and examined earlier, plus the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia
and Japan. (These countries are clearly important controls for any story about
European unemployment). There seems to be little point in looking at ye ar—to—
year movements in institutions or in shocks unless one wants to learn more about
dynamic effects, and this would take us too far, So, as in earlier figures, we divide
time into 8 five-year periods, from 1960—64 to 1995+.
Following Nickell, we use measures for eight "labor market institutions" (The
reader is referred to Nickell [1997] for more details):
•Three are measures of different dimensions of the unemployment insurance
system: the replacement rate (RR), the number of years over which un-
employment benefits are paid (Ben), and a measure of active labor market
policies (ALMP).
•One is a measure of employment protection (EP).
•One is a measure of the tax wedge (Tax).
•The last three measure aspects of collective bargaining: union contract cov-
erage (Coy), union density (Den), and (union and employer) coordination
of bargaining (Coor).
The results of estimation of equation (1) (by non—linear least squares) are pre-
sented in Table 1. All the measures of labor market institutions are defined so
that an increase in the measure is expected to increase the effect of an adverse
shock on unemployment: the expected sign of each b3 is positive.20 Also all mea-
sures of institutions are constructed as deviations from the cross—country mean;
this way the time effects gives the evolution of unemployment for a country with
mean values for all 8 institutions.
20. Thus, we multiply the original Nickel! measures of active !abor market policies and of coordi-
nation by —1. We take the expected effect of employment protection to be that more employment
protection leads to a larger effect of adverse shocks on unemployment, and the expected effect of
coordination that more coordination reduces the effects of adverse shocks on unemploymentTable 1. Time effects interacted with fixed institutions.
(1) (2) (3)
CoefficientsRange of Implied range of
independent effect of shock
variable (mean 1)
Time effects * 73%
Replacement rate 0.017 (5.1)—46.332.6 0.211.55
Benefit length 0.206 (4.9) —2.0 1.6 0.601.33
Active labor policy 0.017 (3.0)—47.2 9.5 0.201.16
Employment protection0.045 (3.1) —9.5 9.5 0.581.42
Tax wedge 0.018 (3.2) —17.822.2 0.681.40
Union coverage 0.098 (0.6) —1.7 0.3 0.831.03
Union density 0.009 (2.1)—30.439.6 0.731.36
Coordination 0.304 (5.1) —2.0 2.0 0.40 1.60
Country effects yes
0.863
*: Time effects: Estimated time effect for 1995 +minusestimated time effect for
1960-1965. Column (1): regression results, t—statistics in parentheses. Number of
observations: 159.Shocks and Institutions 22
The results of Table 1 are surprisingly strong (relative to our priors). The estimated
equation gives the following description of the data:
•Estimated time effects account for an increase in the unemployment rate
equal to 7.3%. That is, the equation implies that, if a country had had mean
values for all eight institutions, its unemployment rate would have grown
by 7.3% over the period.
•Coefficients on all 8 institutions have the predicted sign: Higher replace-
ment rates, longer duration of unemployment benefits, higher employment
protection, a higher tax wedge, higher union contract coverage and density,
lead to a larger the effect of shocks on unemployment. Active labor mar-
ket policies and coordination lead to a smaller effect (remember our sign
convention in defining each institution).
All coefficients, except for the union coverage variable, are statistically
significant.2'
To give a sense of magnitudes, column (2) gives the range for each insti-
tutional measure (recall that these are deviations from the cross country
mean). Column (3) then shows the effect of a given shock for the lowest
and highest value of the corresponding institution. The way to read the
column is as follows. Take three countries, each with mean values for all
institutions except one—say, employment protection (line 5), Take an ad-
verse shock which would raise unemployment by 1 percentage point in the
country with the mean value of employment protection. Then the same
shock will have an effect of only 0.58 percentage point in the country with
the lowest employment protection, but an effect of 1.42 percentage point in
the country with the highest employment protection. The conclusion one
should draw from column (3) is, given the existing variation in labor market
institutions, the range of the effects of institutions on the impact of a given
21.The t—statistics are computed under the assumption of lid residuals. The residuals show however
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Fig 9 Actual and predicted change in U, 1995+ over 1965-69Shocks and Institutions 23
shock on unemployment is roughly similar across institutions.
Not only are the coefficients on institutions plausible, but the model does
a good job of explaining the differential evolution of unemployment rates
across countries. Fig 9 plots the change in the actual and the fitted unem-
ployment rate from 1965-69 to 1995+. The fit is quite good. Interactions
between common shocks and different institutions can account for much of
the actual difference in the evolution of unemployment rates across coun-
tries. (Recall that a pure time effect model with no interactions would pre-
dict no variation in predicted unemployment rates across countries all the
points would lie on a horizontal line.)
•Another way of thinking about these results is as foiiows. Consider a model
with unobservable shocks and unobservable institutions—equivalently a
model with time, country, and interacted time and country effects:
=c,+ d(1 + b1) + eit (1')
Equation (1) can then be thought of as imposing the restriction that b be
a linear function of country i's institutions: b => This raises the
question of how much better we would do if we did not impose this restric-
tion and estimated equation (1') instead. One way to answer the question
is to look at two R2s. The R2 from estimation of (1') is 0.903, compared to
0.863 in Table 1. The R2 from a second stage regression of the estimated
on labor market institutions X,'s is 0.57. We read these results as saying
that (1) the statistical description of the evolution of unemployment as the
result between shocks and institutions has the potential to give a good de-
scription of the data (as reflected in the first stage R2), and that (2) labor
market institutions do a good job of explaining country interaction effects
(as reflected in the second stage R2).
In short, equation (1) gives a good description of the heterogeneity of unemploy-Shocks and Institutions 24
ment evolutions as the result of interactions between shocks and institutions.
These results are indeed consistent with the two cross sections estimated by Nick-
elI, and show that his results are robust both to the use of a longer time period
and the introduction of country effects.22
One must worry however that these results are in part the result of research Dar-
winism. The measures used by Nickell have all been constructed ex-post facto, by
researchers who were not unaware of unemployment developments. When con-
structing a measure of employment protection for Spain, it is hard to forget that
unemployment in Spain is very high... Also, given the complexity in measuring
institutions, measures which do well in explaining unemployment have survived
better than those that did not. Thus, in the rest of the section, we look at robust-
ness.
Dropping institutions, countries, or country fixed effects
To give a sense of robustness with respect to the set of institutions, column (1)
in Table 2 reports the results of 8 separate regressions, each regression allowing
interactions with only one of the 8 measures for institutions. When introduced on
their own, three measures are highly significant: the length of benefits, the degree
of employment protection, and the degree of union coverage (which is insignifi-
cant in the multivariate specification). In contrast, the replacement rate, which
is highly significant in the multivariate specification, is insignificant when intro-
duced alone. Another strategy is to see what happens when we drop one institu-
tion at a time. The results (not reported) indicate that the coefficients reported
in Table 1 are robust to such a variation.
Second, we look at robustness with respect to the set of countries. In general,
22, There are however some differences between estimated coefficients. In particular: Employment
protection is significant here, not in Nickell, Union contract coverage is not significant here, but is






RR 0.004 (1.0) 0.017 (4.1)
Ben 0.268 (6.6) 0.2 13 (4.1)
ALMP 0.007 (1.4) 0.017 (2.4)
EP 0.043 (4.0) 0.049 (2.8)
Tax 0.012 (2.2) 0.017 (2.4)
Coy 0.532 (4.9) 0.049 (0.2)
Dens —0.002 (—0,5) 0.009 (1.8)
Coor 0.048 (1.1) 0.301 (4.3)
CE yes no
0.797
Column (1): each coefficient is estimated using a different regression, allowing
interactions between the time effects and the specific institution variable. Col-
umn (2): Levels of institutional measures entered, but coefficients not reported.
Number of observations: 159.Shocks and Institutions 25
dropping one country at a time makes little difference to the results (not reported
here). The only exception is the importance of Spain in determining the coeffi-
cient on employment protection. When dropping Spain, the coefficient on em-
ployment protection goes from 0.045 in Table Ito 0.015.
Third, we look at robustness with respect to the treatment of country effects.
Column (2) in Table 2 reports the results of estimation of equation (1), replacing
country effects by the set of (time invariant) measures of labor market institu-
tions for each country. That is, it imposes the constraint that all differences in
unemployment rates be explained by differences in institutions; such a constraint
is surely too strong, but it is worth seeing how it affects the results. Only the co-
efficients on interactions are reported in column (2). They are roughly the same
as in Table 1. The coefficients on the levels of the labor market institutions (not
reported) are typically insignificant. The fit is significantly worse than in Table 1.
Looking at alternative measures of institutions
Table 3 looks at the implications of using alternative measures for some of the
institutions. This is the work—in—progress part of our article. Our goal is eventually
to construct time series for all 8 institutions. So far, we have done so only for
replacement rates and for employment protection. Columns (1) and (2) report
our results using alternative measures for replacement rates, Columns (3) and (4)
report our results using alternative measures for employment protection.
Using the OECD database on replacement rates for each country since 1961,
we construct an alternative set of measures for the generosity of unemployment
insurance. The first measure, RRI, is the replacement rate during the first year
of an unemployment spell, averaged over all categories. The second, RR25, is the
average replacement rate during years 2 to 5 of an unemployment spell, averaged
over all categories.
Column (1) shows the results of estimation using time invariant values for RR1Table 3. Time eITects interacted with institutions.Alternative measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AlternativeTime varyingAlternativeTime varying
replacementreplacementemploymentemployment
rates rates protection protection
Time effects 7.3% 6.2% 7.3% 7.1%
(N) RR 0.017 (5,2) 0.017 (4.7)
(N) Ben 0.238 (5.6) 0.205 (4.4)
(Alt) RR1 0.009 (2.6) 0.007 (2.0)
(Alt) P.R250.009 (1.4) 0.019 (2.7)
(N) ALMP0.014 (1.6) 0.005 (0.5) 0.019 (3.2) 0.017 (2.6)
(N) EP 0.024 (1.4) 0.032 (1.7)
(Alt) EP 0.294 (4.3) 0.167 (2.2)
(N) Tax 0.016 (2.4) 0.015 (2.1) 0.019 (3.5) 0.021 (3.7)
(N) Coy 0.413 (2.1) 0.395 (1.9) 0.085 (0.5) 0.287 (1.8)
(N) Dens 0.004 (0.8) 0.000 (0.0) 0.010 (2.5) 0.008 (1.7)
(N) Coor 0.272 (4.9) 0.325 (4.5) 0.392 (6.5) 0.361 (5.3)
CE yes yes yes yes
2 0.824 0.831 0.872 0.857
(N) means Nickell measure. Column (1): estimation using time—invariant values
of RR1 and RR25, equal to their average values for 1985-1990. Column (2): es-
timation using the time series for RR1 and RR25. Column (3): estimation using
the value of EP for the late 1980s. Column (4): estimation using the time series
for ER Number of observations: 159.Shocks and Institutions 26
and RR25. For comparisons with the results using Nickell's measures which apply
to the late 1980s and early 1990s, we use the mean value of the two replacement
rates for the period 1985—1989. Measures for the other 6 institutions are the same
as in Table 1. The fit is a bit worse than in Table 1. The two replacement rates are
both individually significant, and jointly highly significant. Coefficients on the
other labor market institutions are often less significant than in Table 1. In par-
ticular, the coefficient on employment protection is smaller, and less significant.
Column (2) shows the results of estimation using time—varying measures for RR1
and RR25. Relative to column (1), the fit, measured by 2,ismarginally improved
(but is still worse than in Table 1). The part of the increase in unemployment
due to time effects decreases from 7.3% to 6.2%. Coefficients on labor market
institutions are largely the same as in column (1).
Columns (3) and (4) use the index of employment protection discussed in Section
2, In contrast to the Nickell index, which is a ranking of countries and thus ranges
from 1 to 20, this index is a cardinal index, ranging theoretically from 0 to 6,
empirically from 0 to about 4. Thus, in comparing coefficients to those obtained
using the Nickell specification, keep in mind that the coefficients should be about
5 times larger to generate the same effect on unemployment.
Column (3) shows the results of estimation using time—invariant values of the
index, equal to its value for 1985—1989. The results are very similar to Table 1.
2isa little higher. The effect of employment protection is similar in magnitude
to that in Table 1 (i.e the coefficient is about 5 times larger), and highly significant.
Column (4) shows the results of estimation using the time varying values of the
employment protection index. Allowing for time variation does not improve the
results: 1?2isslightly lower. The coefficient on the employment protection index
decreases by nearly half and becomes less significant. These results can be read in
three ways. First, the effects of employment protection are indeed less strong than
suggested by previous regressions using time—invariant measures. Two, the timeShocks and Institutions 27
series we have constructed for employment protection are not very reliable; as we
discussed in Section 2, we are worried about the evolution of the index in the early
part of the sample. Three, our earlier and apparently stronger results come in fact
from reverse causality. Under this interpretation, the rise in unemployment has led
over time to more employment protection, which is why there is a close relation
between employment protection at the end of the sample and unemployment.
But employment protection has little effect on unemployment, which is why the
relation is weaker when using time series. Given the lack of strong evidence about
the presence of a strong and reliable feedback from unemployment to institutions,
we are skeptical; but we cannot exclude this interpretation.
To conclude: A model with common unobservable shocks and interactions with
institutions provides a good description of the evolution of unemployment rates
across time and countries. The description appears reasonably robust—although
less so with respect to time variation in institutions. This conclusion leaves open
the issue of what these shocks might have been, and whether they have indeed
been similar across countries. For this reason, we now turn to a specification based
on observable shocks.
5Country specific observable shocks, and interactions
The benchmark specification we use in this section is the following:
=c,+ (Yktak) (1 + + (2)
k j
where the notation is the same as before, but the unobservable common shocks
of section 3 are now replaced by a set of country specific shocks; Ykit denotes
shock k for country i in period t.23 gain, our benchmark relies on time invariant
23. Most theories predict that the interaction of institutions and shocks may be different for differentShocks and Institutions 28
measures of institutions, thus the lack of an index t for X. Later on, we look at
results allowing for time variation for institutions.)
Following the discussion in Section 2, we consider three sources of shocks and
construct three variables for each country and each period. They are the rate of
TFP growth, the real rate of interest, and the labor demand shift measure, respec-
tively. We enter them as levels, but, given the presence of country dummies in
the regression, they can be thought of as deviations from country averages—or
from their 1960 values. To make it easy to read the tables, each variable is mea-
sured so an increase is expected to increase unemployment initially; therefore the
original measure of TFP growth is multiplied by —1. Due to some missing data for
some countries, the panel is (slightly) unbalanced. Also, one observation requires
special treatment. As discussed in Blanchard [1997], the Portuguese revolution
was associated with a large permanent increase in the measured labor share (20%
of GDP) —without a corresponding increase in unemployment. While this evolu-
tion is interesting in its own right, we have decided to ignore it by allowing for a
dummy for Portugal, from 1960 to 1974,24
The natural first question is: Ignoring differences in institutions across countries,
how much of the evolutions of unemployment across time and countries can be
explained by our three shocks? The answer is given in Table 4 and in Fig 10.
Column 1 in Table 4 presents regressions of the unemployment rate on the three
shocks, leaving institutions out. Two of the three shocks (TFP growth, and the real
interest rate) are significant. A decrease in TFP growth of 3 percentage points, as
has happened in many countries, translates into an increase in the unemployment
shocks. But allowing for different interactions between each shock and each institution struck us as
asking too much from our limited data set (131 data points for the regressions in this section).
24. The difference between macro and labor panel data regressions is that, in macro, each data point
is intimately known by the researcher.,.Table 4. Shocks only.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var u u*
sacrifice sacrifice
ratio=2.0 ratio=4.0
TFPgrowth 0.47 (3.1) 0.36 (2.6) 0.25 (1.7)
Real rate 0.67 (5.6) 0.63 (6.1) 0.63 (6.1)
LD shift 0.07 (1.1) 0.08 (1.5) 0,09 (1.7)
CE yes yes yes
j2 0.566 0.590 0.584
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Fig10Actual & Predicted Change in U, 1965-69 to 1990-94Shocks and Institutions 29
rate of about 1.5%. An increase in the real interest rate of 5 percentage points
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of 3%. A decrease in the adjusted
labor share of 10 percentage points, such as happened in France and in Spain since
the mid 1980s, leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of about 1%. So,
these shocks appear indeed to explain part of the evolution of the unemployment
rate across time and countries.
Do differences in the magnitude of shocks explain the cross country heterogeneity
in unemployment increases? The answer, as shown in Fig 10 is no. The figure plots
the change in fitted unemployment against the change in actual unemployment
from 1965-1969 to 1990-1994 (this is the longest time span for which data are
available for all countries.). The relation is positive, but poor. The Netherlands
and Spain have the same predicted increase in unemployment, yet very different
outcomes. In short, the heterogeneity of shocks cannot account for much of the
heterogeneity of unemployment evolutions.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 present a rough attempt to adjust unemployment
for deviations of actual from equilibrium unemployment. We start from the as-
sumption that the following "Phillips curve" relation holds between the change
in inflation, the actual and the equilibrium rate of unemployment:
Lr =—a(u —
Wethen construct "equilibrium unemployment" as 4= Ut+ (1/a)irt; 1/a is
often called the sacrifice ratio. Estimates of a for Europe for annual data typically
range from 0.25 to 0.50.25 Column (2) constructs u' using a sacrifice ratio of 2.0;
25. If our approach to measuring the equilibrium unemployment rate is right howeveç then most
existing estunates of a, which rely on a much rougher measure of equilibrium unemployment, are
not right. We did not take up the task of estimating a in this article.Table 5. Shocks interacted with fixed institutions.
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column (3) does the same using a ratio of 4.0.26Thefit in columns (2) and (3) is
better than in column (1)—the dependent variable is not the same however. The
effects of each of the three shock variables are roughly similar.
Table 5 presents the results of the specification that allows for both shocks and
interactions with institutions. Column (1) presents the results from estimating
the benchmark specification (2).
All three variables measuring shocks are now very significant. The effects of TFP
growth and the labor demand shift are larger than in Table 4, the effects of the
real interest rate slightly smaller. A decrease in TFP growth of 3 percentage points
translates into an increase in the unemployment rate of about 2%. An increase in
the real interest rate of 5 percentage points leads to an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate of 2.5%. A decrease in the adjusted labor share of 10 percentage points
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of about 2%.
Coefficients on 7 of 8 institutions have the expected sign. Only union coverage
is negative, but insignificant. The most significant coefficients are on the replace-
ment rate, the length of benefits, union density and coordination. Except for
union coverage, the pattern of coefficients is the same as in Table 1 (estimated
with unobservable shocks), up to a factor of proportionality greater than 1. That
is, they are in general 1.5 to 2 times larger than in Table 1. The mechanical ex-
planation is that the observable shocks explain less of the general increase in un-
employment, and the interactions, must therefore explain more. The R2 is much
lower than in Table 1: Despite the fact that they can differ across countries, the 3
observable shocks do not do as good a job as the set of 8 time effects in Table 1.
The specification does a good job of explaining differences in unemployment evo-
lutions across countries. This is shown in Fig 11, which plots the change in fitted
26. In doing so, we are implicitly assuming that the sacrifice ratio is not related to institutions. This
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unemployment against the change in actual unemployment, from 1965-1969 to
1990-1994. The fit is quite good; clearly much better than in Fig 10, if not quite
as good as in Fig 9. Fig 12 gives another way of looking at fit, by plotting the actual
and fitted unemployment rate for each of the 20 countries over time. The visual
impression is one of a good fit in nearly all cases. (To facilitate comparison of un-
employment rates across countries, the vertical scale is the same for all countries.
The drawback is that it is harder to assess the fit for each country.)
Column (2) looks at the effects of entering institutions one at a time. The con-
clusions are largely similar to those in the previous section. In particular, union
coverage is very significant on its own, but not in combination with other insti-
tutions. Column (3) replaces actual by equilibrium unemployment, assuming a
sacrifice ratio of 2.0. The fit is better, but the results are otherwise very similar.
Table 6 looks at alternative measures of institutions. Its structure is the same as
that of Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) look at the effects of using the two measures
of replacement rates using OECD data. Column (1) uses a time invariant value
equal to the average for 1985-1989; column (2) uses the time series. Columns (3)
and (4) do the same for employment protection. The table suggests two conclu-
sions, both worrisome: Replacing the Nickell measures by alternative, but time
invariant measures, substantially decreases the B2. Going from the time invari-
ant to the time varying measures further decreases the fit. The coefficients on
institutions remain consistently positive, but are typically smaller than in Table
5, and less significant. These results lead to the same discussion as in Section 3:
Luck, or data mining, when the standard set of measures is used? Poor time series
for institutions, interacting here with the fact that we are looking at their prod-
uct with time varying and also imperfectly measured shocks? Or reverse causality
(although the fact that the deterioration of fit happens when replacing one time
invariant measure by another is not supportive of this hypothesis).
To conclude: One can indeed give a good account of the evolution of unemploy-
ment across countries and times by relying on observable shocks and interactionsShocks and Institutions 32
with labor market institutions. The fact that the results are weaker when using
time varying institutions is worrying. But, again, the results strike us as surprisingly
good overall.
6 Conclusions
We see our results as preIiminary We see our dynamic specification of the effects
of shocks as much too crude. We still need to construct and introduce time se-
ries for some labor market institutions. We worry about the endogeneity of labor
market institutions. Nevertheless, we believe that the results so far suggest that an
account of the evolution of unemployment based on the interaction of shocks and
institutions can do a good job of fitting the evolution of European unemployment,
both over time and across countries.
If our account is correct, one can be mildly optimistic about the future of Euro-
pean unemployment. The effects of some of the adverse shocks should go away.
The real interest rate is likely to be lower in the future than in the recent past. The
dynamic effects of what we have identified as adverse labor demand shifts should
eventually prove favorable to employment. Institutions are also slowly becom-
ing employment—friendly. Our results suggest that the more favorable macroeco-
nomic environment and the improvement in institutions should lead to a sub-
stantial decline in unemployment.Shocks and Institutions 33
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